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1 Introduction
Researchers and practitioners interested in the tax burdens of companies almost
exclusively focus on direct tax costs (eg, Slemrod, 2004; Vandenbussche et al, 2005).
However, in addition to tax payments, companies are confronted with costs to comply
with the tax legislation, and these costs can be significant. Small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) are especially burdened by compliance costs as they often do not
have in-house specialists to deal with the many bureaucratic and legal knowledge
requirements (Gurd et al, 1998). In fact, tax compliance costs (TCCs) rank among
the top burdens as perceived by SMEs (O'Reilly, 2005). For instance, for the UK
Chittenden et al (1999) show that 25% of the total tax burden for small limited
companies is related to self-reported costs of compliance. Despite heightened public
and political sensitivity for TCCs, there are only a handful of empirical studies
investigating this topic. With the intention of broadening the empirical evidence, we
examine the TCCs of Belgian SMEs located in Flanders. To our knowledge we are the
first to do so. As well as being characterized for its high tax rates on companiesö
the Belgian total tax burden is as high as 58%öBelgium is a particularly interesting
country to assess TCCs in the sense that it has a very complex tax system. There are no
fewer than ninety-two different taxes imposed by the Belgian authorities (overview in
appendix). This is a very high number compared with other countries. In the UK, for
example, only twenty-two charges exist and in Australia fifty-six taxes are levied (PwC
and Federation of Enterprises in Belgium, 2009). Moreover, new taxes are frequently
introduced in Belgium and existing charges are often adjusted. This results in new
compliance costs because of initial learning costs (Holtzman, 2007). Of the ninety-
two taxes imposed by the Belgian tax system, thirty-nine are taxes collected. Taxes
collected are taxes such as employee social security contributions that are gathered
and subsequently transferred to the government by a company. Contrary to taxes borne
(eg corporate taxes), these taxes will not directly affect a firm's results. However, the
taxes collected often generate the highest part of a company's compliance costs and
thereby indirectly influence a company's bottom line. Firms act as subcontractors of
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the government for the collection of taxes without having the possibility to charge a fee
for these services. Nevertheless, it must be noted that taxes collected can also induce
cash flow benefits. A time lag often exists between the moment of tax collection and
the moment of cash transfer to the government. Companies can benefit from these
temporary cash flows by taking them into account in their cash-flow management
(Tran-Nam et al, 2000).
Our study focuses on SMEs because, as in many countries, they are increasingly
important for the economy, not least in terms of employment. In Belgium 99.4% of the
companies are SMEs and they generate more than 70% of the gross domestic product.
High compliance costs can diminish small firms' profitability and consequently can
slow down economic growth.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we provide a
definition of TCCs and a literature review. In section 3 we discuss our methodology.
In section 4 we present our empirical findings, while in section 5 we conduct a
sensitivity analysis. In section 6 we discuss a number of policy recommendations that
might contribute to reducing compliance costs. We conclude in section 7.
2 Definition and literature review
TCCs can be defined as the costs incurred by taxpayers in meeting the requirements laid
on them by tax law and the revenue authorities, in addition to the tax liability itself
(Sandford, 1995). According to Smulders and Stiglingh (2008), TCCs typically include
the following elements: (1) the amount of time spent by business owners, managers,
staff, and others on understanding and applying the rules, (2) record-keeping costs,
(3) the payments for the expertise of professional advisors such as consultants, lawyers,
and accountants, and (4) incidental costs such as postage, telephone, and travel in
communicating with advisors or the tax authorities. These compliance costs are
generally inevitable and irreducible (Tran-Nam et al, 2000). Moreover, they are difficult
to calculate in detail, which causes the costs to remain hidden between other admin-
istrative costs. Companies are therefore often not aware of the adverse consequences
that compliance costs have on their profitability. In addition, high compliance costs
can inhibit foreign investors from making new investments, as they often base their
investment decisions on the tax regimes that are applicable in a particular country.
Indeed, tax legislation appears to be an important factor in the competition for external
investments between different countries. A lack of external investments can slow down
economic growth, innovation, and technological progress (PwC and World Bank
Group, 2008).
Although the empirical research on TCCs is scarce, there have been a number of
investigations in certain countries and regions around the world, among which are the
US (Slemrod and Venkatesh, 2002), Australia (Pope, 1993), Canada (Soufani, 2003),
the UK (Hansford et al, 2003; Poutziouris et al, 1999; Sandford, 1995), Singapore (Ariff
et al, 1997), and Hong Kong (Chan et al, 1999). (1) A problem with international
comparisons, however, is that there is no common definition of compliance cost and
no accepted methodology to obtain empirical assessments (Chittenden et al, 2003).
While cross-country comparisons are therefore difficult to conduct and should be
treated with care, there nonetheless seems to be consensus that TCCs are significant.
With regard to the determinants of the cross-sectional variation within a country of
TCCs, there are a number of common variables that appear regularly in the empirical
literature.
(1) A review of the literature on compliance costs in the USA, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand
is provided in Chittenden et al (2003).
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2.1 Size
Several studies document a negative relation between company size and compliance
costs relative to turnover (Blumenthal and Slemrod, 1992; Hanefah et al, 2002; Pope,
1993; Sandford et al, 1989; Slemrod and Venkatesh, 2002; Vaillancourt, 1986). In a
comprehensive review of administrative and compliance costs of goods and services
taxes (GSTs), Cnossen (1994) indicates that the relative compliance costs related to
GSTs predominantly encumber SMEs. The reason that small businesses bear higher
relative compliance costs can partly be explained by the fact that compliance costs are
to a certain extent fixed. Therefore, large firms can enjoy economies of scale in their
compliance costs. Furthermore, Chittenden et al (2005) show that the highly regressive
nature of pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) and National Insurance contribution compliance
costs is primarily caused by the number of hours that business owners and directors
spend on the administration of PAYE. At start-up, business owners will perform many
tax administration tasks themselves, whereas in later growth stages these tasks will be
delegated to `less expensive' administrative employees.
2.2 Outsourcing
In large companies most routine tasks related to fiscal administration are performed
internally. Additionally, more complex tasks can be outsourced to external consultants
(Blumenthal and Slemrod, 1996). Small companies often lack the scale to develop
in-house expertise. However, whether this is a disadvantage is an empirical question,
the outcome depends on the number of hours spent and the relative hourly prices of
internal and external resources. In addition, Coolidge et al (2009) warn about the
disadvantages of applying partial outsourcing. Partial outsourcing is not efficient
when many tasks are duplicated internally and externally.
2.3 Industry
Most country studies investigate the diversity of compliance costs across industries
(Blumenthal and Slemrod, 1996; Chan et al, 1999; Slemrod and Venkatesh, 2002).
In general, there seems to exist a wide variation in TCCs by industry. For example,
Blumenthal and Slemrod (1996) show that firms in the retail or wholesale industry
have significantly lower TCCs on average, and firms in primary industry have signifi-
cantly higher costs. Nevertheless, no unequivocal conclusions can be drawn concerning
which industries are burdened most by tax compliance.
2.4 Workforce
A fraction of the ninety-two Belgian taxes are employee related (employee social
security contributions, employer social security contributions, personal income
tax, etc). It is obvious that the number of employees will have an impact on absolute
compliance costs. The proportion between the number of blue-collar workers and the
total work force (white collar and blue collar) can also be a determining factor. In
Belgium white-collar workers are more likely to receive a wider range of employee
benefits than blue-collar workers. However, employee benefits can cause high TCCs.
Hence, firms with a high proportion of white-collar workers might have greater
TCCs. Finally, Collard and Godwin (1999) show that casual employment can drasti-
cally increase compliance costs. TCCs for the administration of casual employees
appear to be approximately twice as high as those for part-time employees. Further-
more, full timers appear to increase compliance costs to a larger extent than part
timers.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Data collection
Similarly to most studies in this area, our data were obtained by an electronic Internet-
based anonymous survey. (2) The survey was conducted among members of VOKA,
which is a professional network of Flemish entrepreneurs (http://www.voka.be). The
questionnaire was developed by a team consisting of academics, members of the
research team of VOKA, and tax practitioners. To ensure that the questions in
the survey were unambiguous, comprehensible, and relevant, a pilot study was con-
ducted. This pilot study took place at a predetermined educational event organized
by VOKA among a group of entrepreneurs. The survey was introduced as an Internet
link in a covering e-mail. This mail was signed by the University of Ghent and VOKA
to stress the anonymity and official character of the survey. The survey was directed to
the entrepreneurs and not to tax practitioners. However, in the survey the entrepre-
neurs were requested to forward the survey to their tax consultants if (part of ) the
compliance task was outsourced, after filling in their internal compliance costs (if any).
Afterwards, the input from the entrepreneurs and the tax consultants was totaled per
company.
Although most studies ask a direct estimate of total TCCs, our pilot testing showed
that more detailed questioning resulted in more accurate estimations of compliance
costs. Therefore, the survey asked about compliance cost per category at a fairly
disaggregated level of tax categories (see table 1). A potential advantage of using a
lower level of aggregation in taxes than is normally used in the literature on compli-
ance costs was that it decreased the possibility that some tax categories might be
overlooked by respondents. Furthermore, the respondents were questioned about all
possible costs involved in the tax filing process. These costs include prefiling (eg follow-
up of new fiscal legislation, forecasting of tax payments), filing (eg calculation of the
tax arrears, execution of the tax payments), and postfiling (eg control and auditing
services) costs.
(2) By using a web-based survey, we exclude businesses that do not use electronic platforms.
However, as argued by Guyton et al (2005), tax software might lower compliance costs to some
extent. Consequently, if these companies do not make use of electronic platforms for their tax
administration, tax compliance costs might be somewhat underestimated in our sample. The survey
is available on request.
Table 1. Calculation of absolute tax compliance cost (TCC).
Prefiling, filing, and postfiling costs of value-added tax (VAT), customs, and excise duties
+ prefiling, filing, and postfiling costs of corporate income tax
+ prefiling, filing, and postfiling costs for withholding and property taxes
+ prefiling, filing, and postfiling costs of environmental taxes
+ tax compliance component of the labor taxesa
+ consulting and lawyer costs concerning fiscal items
+ tax compliance component of auditing costs
+ preparation and execution of prepayments
+ costs related to AOIF control and general tax controlsb
+ costs related to VAT control
+ compliance costs related to provincial and municipal taxes
= Total TCC
aThroughout the paper, we use the term labor taxes to indicate the compliance costs related to
the total of employee social security contributions, employer social security contributions and
personal income tax.
bAOIF denotes ‘Administratie voor Ondernemings-en Inkomensfiscaliteit’ (Administration for
Business and Income Taxation).
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As revealed by the pilot testing, a disadvantage of our detailed questioning was that
the survey proved to be rather time consuming. To alleviate the disincentive effect
caused by this, participants were stimulated by a reward. By means of a web applica-
tion, respondents' own compliance costs were computed and were displayed to them
immediately after full completion of the questionnaire. This postsurvey `reward' not
only created an incentive to participate, but also provided a motivation for participants
to provide accurate answers in order to increase the realism of their own total
compliance cost estimate.
The survey consisted of two parts. The first was used to gather firm identification
data (number of employees, main business activity, etc). In the second part, participants
were asked to provide information about the compliance costs of the firm. For each
tax item respondents could choose whether they estimated the total compliance cost of
the item or the time spent on the compliance activities related to the item. In order to
compute the tax compliance cost in the latter case, a rate of 70 per hour was used for
external services and a lower rate of 50 per hour for internal services. Both hour rates
are considered before-taxes measures of cost. These rates were based on estimated
average market prices. In the pilot study, internal and external accountants confirmed
these rates to be representative for Belgian companies. The reason why respondents
could also opt for estimating their time spent was the fact that the pilot study had
revealed that some participants felt more comfortable estimating time units while others
preferred monetary amounts.
3.2 Sample
As mentioned, our sample consists of SMEs that are members of VOKA. For our
survey, and in line with the European Commission's definition, we defined an SME
as a company with a workforce of a maximum of 250 employees. We excluded non-
profit organizations, banks and insurance companies, and public service providers.
This elimination is in line with other empirical work (eg, Blumenthal and Slemrod,
1996) and is motivated by the fact that these organizations face specific fiscal regu-
lations. In addition we omitted sole proprietors and other firms that are not liable to
corporate taxation but instead fall under the personal tax regime. After deletion of
companies with no e-mail address, our final mailing list consisted of 10300 Flemish
SMEs. The questionnaire was sent to the whole mailing list. After two weeks, a
follow-up mail was sent to all companies that had not responded in order to increase
the response rate. Eventually 184 responses were received, which corresponds to a
1.8% response rate. Some thirty-three returned questionnaires could not be used
because of incomplete or unreliable answers. Consequently, our final sample consists
of 151 acceptable responses.
3.3 Variables
Table 1 shows how the absolute TCC is calculated. For each item, respondents could
choose whether they estimated the total compliance cost of the item or the time spent
on the compliance activities related to the item. In order to compute the TCC in the
latter case, a rate of 70 per hour was used for external services and a lower rate of
50 per hour was used for internal services.
Outsourcing is a dummy variable indicating 1 if a company partially outsources
(ie makes use of an internal and an external accountant) and 0 otherwise.
The blue-collar workers ratio is defined as the proportion of blue-collar workers
in the total workforce.
 Industry is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a company is operating in the
services industry and 0 if it is situated in the manufacturing industry.
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3.4 Nonresponse bias
In order to detect potential nonresponse bias, the extrapolation approach suggested
by Armstrong and Overton (1977) was followed. Their method assumes that late
respondents are similar to nonrespondents. Therefore, we examined whether significant
differences in TCCs between early and late respondents existed. Our analysis shows
that early and late respondents do not differ significantly in terms of absolute TCCs
( p  0:9914), compliance costs relative to assets ( p  0:4827), and compliance costs
relative to gross added value ( p  0:9789). On the basis of this evidence there are no
indications of nonresponse bias in our sample.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Descriptives
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics from the companies that participated in the
survey. The average SME in our sample has 6853273 of total assets and an added
value of 2234167. Some 55% of the SMEs are partially outsourcing, 86.1% are older
than ten years and 58.28% of the firms have fewer than twenty employees. (3) Further-
more, 60.3% of the SMEs operate on an international scale. The average percentage of
blue-collar workers is 46%.
Table 3 shows the size and industry distribution of our sample. The sample dis-
tributions are compared with the distributions of the population of Flemish SMEs,
which are retrieved from the BelFirst database of the Bureau Van Dijk. (4) Table 3(a)
displays the size distribution, where size is measured as the number of employees. Both
the sample and population distribution are clearly highly right skewed, which is typical
for this kind of size distribution. In our sample, however, smaller companies seem
underrepresented. Some 58.28% of the sample companies have zero to twenty employ-
ees, whereas the equivalent is 90.48% for the total population. If compliance costs
prove to be regressive in nature, this might cause underestimation of the TCCs of
(3)Working owner-directors are not included in the number of employees.
(4) Belfirst is a database containing detailed information about the financial statements of Belgian
and Luxembourg companies. The database is provided by Bureau Van Dijk.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
error
Tax compliance costs (TCCs)
Absolute TCC 151 3 824.700 80 032.500 26 230.540 21 730.910
TCC relative to assets 146 0.001 0.104 0.021 0.029
TCC relative to gross added value 139 0.003 0.376 0.071 0.102
Firm characteristics
Total assets ( thousand) 146 85.908 39 349.800 6 853.273 10 561.490
Added value ( thousand) 139 14.500 11 914.000 2 234.167 3 215.106
Outsourcing 151 0 1 0.550 0.499
Export 151 0 1 0.603 0.491
Age 151 0 1 0.861 0.347
Industry 151 0 1 0.305 0.462
Blue-collar workers 151 0 1 0.460 0.377
Note: absolute TCC, TCC relative to assets, TCC relative to gross added value, total assets,
and added value are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles in order to mitigate the effect of
outliers; observations with added values smaller than 0 are deleted from the sample.
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Flemish SMEs in our sample. Table 3(b) documents the distribution of the respond-
ing firms according to industry. Similar to the population firms, the majority of
the sample firms are active in wholesale and retail, construction, and other services.
However, the production sector is overrepresented in the sample while other ser-
vices are underrepresented. Since some sector classes are fairly small in our sample,
we have opted to aggregate the industry groups into two classes for the statistical
analyses: `manufacturing' (consisting of the first four industry categories in table 3)
and `services' (consisting of the last four industry categories in table 3). The service
industry is underrepresented in our sample (30.45% compared with 46.15% for the
population), whereas the manufacturing industry is overrepresented (69.55% com-
pared with 53.85% for the population). If compliance costs prove to be higher for
the service industry, this might cause underestimation of the TCCs of Flemish SMEs
in our sample.
Figure 1 indicates that VAT (50%), labor taxes (21%), and corporate taxes (11%),
totaling 80%, are the main components of TCCs. These figures are in line with con-
clusions drawn from earlier research conducted by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and
the World Bank Group (PwC and World Bank Group, 2011). According to this
study, 61.5% of the compliance costs were caused by VAT, 25.5% by labor taxes
and 13% by corporate taxes. It is remarkableöand reassuring for the validity
of our resultsöthat the relative percentage share of VAT, labor taxes and corporate
tax is almost exactly the same for our results as it is in the study of the PwC and
World Bank Group [in our study the share of VAT  50=(50 21 11)  61%,
the share of labor taxes  21=(50 21 11)  26%, the share of corporate
taxes  11=(50 21 11)  13%]. However, the sum of the percentage shares is
lower in our study (82%), because our survey also explicitly asked the respondents
Table 3. Size and industry distributions: (a) size distribution; (b) industrial distribution.
Sample Percentage Population of
of sample Flemish SMEs (%)
(a) Number of employees
0 – 4 47 31.13 62.41
5 – 20 41 27.15 28.07
21 – 50 28 18.54 6.57
51 – 100 17 11.26 1.87
101 – 150 11 7.28 0.59
151 – 200 2 1.32 0.32
201 – 250 5 3.31 0.16
Total 151 100.00 100.00
(b) Industry
Primary industry 6 3.97 2.24
Production 37 24.50 9.67
Construction 18 11.94 15.02
Wholesale and retail 44 29.14 26.92
Hotels and restaurants 2 1.32 5.86
Transport and storage 6 3.97 4.16
Real estate 5 3.31 8.96
Other services 33 21.85 27.17
Total 151 100.0 100.00
Note: SME—small and medium-sized enterprise.
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to estimate the compliance costs of control (6%), consulting (6%), environmental
taxes (2%), and the auditor (2%).
Figure 1 clearly reveals that VAT is responsible for the largest part of total TCCs.
This is consistent with previous research (Blazic, 2005; Pope and Rametse, 2001;
Smulders and Stiglingh, 2008; Vaillancourt, 1986) and can be explained by the fact
that VAT must be calculated on a monthly basis by most companies. Cnossen and
Verwaal (2002) show that firms registering their VAT less frequently (eg, quarterly or
annually) have lower compliance costs than firms applying monthly filing frequencies.
Furthermore, a complex taxation system exists for exporting companies, who are
obliged to provide monthly information about their intercommunity (intra-EU) flows
of goods. These administrative tasks can consume a lot of time, thereby increasing the
total compliance costs.
Table 2 indicates that the average absolute compliance cost of an SME in our
sample amounts to 26 230.54. The absolute compliance cost varies between
3824.70 and 80 032.50. The TCC relative to total assets is 2.1% on average.
Relative to gross added value, the compliance cost is on average 7.1%. This means
that 7.1% of added value that is generated by Flemish SMEs serves to cover the cost
of compliance with the Belgian tax regulations. Or, in analogy with the tax freedom
day, which falls on the 8 June in Belgium, companies have to operate an additional
sixteen (ie, 7.1%6 220) days in order to produce sufficient added value from which
to cover TCCs.
Corporate tax
11%
Environmental
tax
2%
Control
6%
Other
2%
Labor taxes
21%
Auditor
2%
Consulting
6%
Value added tax
50%
Figure 1. Breakdown total tax compliance cost.
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4.2 Regressivity
Table 4 reveals that TCCs are highly regressive, which is in line with previous studies on
compliance costs (Blumenthal and Slemrod, 1992; Hanefah et al, 2002; Pope, 1993;
Sandford et al, 1989; Slemrod and Venkatesh, 2002; Vaillancourt, 1986). SMEs with zero
to twenty employees have a TCC relative to assets of 3.2%, on average, while firms with
more than twenty employees have an average relative TCC of only 0.7%. This difference
is significant on a 1% significance level. The aforementioned findings indicate that small
SMEs have a relative TCC that is 4.7 times higher than that of larger SMEs. When we
compare the TCC relative to gross added value between smaller and larger SMEs,
similar conclusions can be drawn. Microenterprises (520 employees) have to spend
on average 10.4% of their gross added value to comply with the tax legislation. For
SMEs with more than twenty employees, this percentage is only 2.70%. The results
remain significant when we use fifty employees as a boundary.
In figure 2 the mean TCC relative to assets is plotted against total assets. When
total assets is used as a measure of size instead of number of employees, again a clear
`regressivity pattern' can be found. Significant differences exist between the two small-
est size classes (total assets of 1 ^ 300 000 and 300 000 ^ 1000 000) and their larger
counterparts. This affirms that microenterprises bear relatively higher compliance costs
compared with larger firms. In combination with the underrepresentation of small
firms in our sample, this regressivity pattern implies that our estimate of compliance
cost as a percentage of added value of 7.1% is probably underestimated.
Table 4. Regressivity.
Variable Number N Mean Standard t
of employees error
TCC relative to assets 0 – 20 85 0.032 0.004 5.695**
>20 61 0.007 0.001
0 – 50 112 0.027 0.003 4.246**
>50 34 0.004 0.001
TCC relative to gross added value 0 – 20 80 0.104 0.013 4.733**
>20 59 0.027 0.008
0 – 50 105 0.088 0.010 3.538**
>50 34 0.020 0.011
**p < 0:01.
Note: TCC—tax compliance cost.
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Figure 2. Regressivity plot.
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4.3 Other determinants
Table 5(a) indicates that companies that partially outsource have a slightly higher
compliance cost relative to gross added value. Partially outsourcing can increase
TCCs as some tasks might be duplicated. However, the difference in relative compli-
ance cost between partially outsourcing and nonpartially outsourcing firms is not
significant in our sample. Industry, by contrast, does seem to be a determining factor
of TCCs relative to assets. In the services industry the TCC relative to assets amounts
to 3.5%, while it is only 1.5% in the manufacturing industry. This difference is sig-
nificant on a 1% significance level. These findings are partially in line with previous
research on TCCs, since it has been shown that there exists a wide variation in TCC
between different industries. However, no consensus exists about which exactly indus-
tries face the highest compliance costs. Contrary to the TCC relative to assets, the
difference in TCC relative to gross added value does not prove to be significant.
Table 5(c) shows that older firms have on average lower relative TCCs compared with
their younger counterparts. It can be argued that older firms enjoy greater learning
effects, by which TCCs might be decreased. Our results confirm this hypothesis, since
the difference in TCC relative to assets between older and younger companies is
significant. Contrary to TCC relative to assets, the difference in TCC relative to gross
added value is not significant. Furthermore, the number of workers also seems to have
an impact on the TCC relative to assets. Firms employing more than 50% blue-collar
workers have a substantially lower TCC relative to assets (1.37%) than firms that
mainly employ white-collar workers (2.89%). In Belgium, white-collar workers often
receive more fringe benefits than blue-collar workers. As fringe benefits cause con-
siderable TCCs, it is logical that firms with a higher number of blue-collar workers
face a lower TCC. The differences in TCC relative to assets and TCC relative to gross
added value are significant on a 1% significance level.
Table 5(e) indicates that exporting firms (both inside and outside the European Union)
have significantly lower relative TCCs than nonexporting firms. This seems counterintui-
tive, as exporting companies are normally expected to face a higher administrative tax
burden. For instance, the tax legislation concerning intracommunity supplies of goods and
services (trade inside the EU) is very complex, resulting in high prefiling TCCs.(5)
Furthermore, firms are obliged to provide monthly Intrastat declarations about their
intracommunity flows of goods and services, which also induces compliance costs. Finally,
firms that export outside the EU are subject to many administrative obligations with
respect to customs, excise duties, etc, which can cause high prefiling and filing compliance
costs. In order to rule out possible confounding effects from the other variables, we
performed a number of covariance analyses. The results show that exporting status
(ie a dummy having a value of one if a firm exports) remains significantly negatively
related to TCCs (both relative to assets as relative to added value), even when controlling
for firm size, age, outsourcing, industry, or the number of blue-collar workers.
5 Sensitivity analyses
As mentioned previously, an hourly rate of 50 for internal services and a rate of 70
for external services was used in order to calculate the absolute TCC. Although the
external and internal accountants in our pilot study confirmed that these rates are
representative for Belgian SMEs, they are to a certain extent arbitrary. In order to
verify whether our results are not influenced by the chosen rates, sensitivity analyses
were conducted. In table 6 the absolute and relative TCCs were recalculated using
(5) Since the introduction of the European single market on 1 January 1993, the tax burden for
intracommunity trade has been slightly reduced.
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different hourly rates. Logically, the absolute TCC diminishes as the rates are
decreased. Since total assets and gross added value are unchanged, the relative TCC
will also lessen when the applied rates are decreased. Table 5 indicates that the
TCC relative to gross added value varies between 4.8% and 7.4%. The TCC relative
to assets fluctuates between 1.5% and 2.3%. In all cases VAT, labor taxes, and corpo-
rate tax are the main causes of TCCs. Our regressivity results are also unchanged when
using different rates. The smallest SMEs bear the highest relative TCCs. Hence, the
sensitivity analyses show that the results in this study are not substantially influenced
by the chosen hourly external and internal services rates.
Table 5. Determining factors of tax compliance costs (TCCs): (a) outsourcing; (b) industry;
(c) age; (d) number of blue-collar workers; (e) export status.
Variable Outsourcing N Mean Standard t
error
(a)
TCC relative to assets 0 63 0.022 0.004 0.401
1 83 0.021 0.003
TCC relative to gross added value 0 61 0.069 0.013 ÿ0.227
1 78 0.073 0.011
(b) Industry N Mean Standard t
error
TCC relative to assets Manufacturing 101 0.015 0.002 ÿ4.052**
Services 45 0.035 0.006
TCC relative to gross added value Manufacturing 97 0.062 0.010 ÿ1.606
Services 42 0.092 0.018
(c) Age N Mean Standard t
error
TCC relative to assets <10 years 19 0.038 0.008 2.709**
>10 years 127 0.019 0.002
TCC relative to gross added value <10 years 18 0.093 0.024 0.963
>10 years 121 0.068 0.009
(d) Blue-collar N Mean Standard t
workers (%) error
TCC relative to assets <50 73 0.029 0.004 3.262**
>50 73 0.014 0.002
TCC relative to gross added value <50 70 0.097 0.014 3.083**
>50 69 0.045 0.010
(e) Export N Mean Standard t
error
TCC relative to assets 0 58 0.032 0.005 3.748**
1 88 0.014 0.002
TCC relative to gross added value 0 54 0.112 0.017 3.988**
1 85 0.045 0.008
**p < 0:01.
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6 Policy implications
Our survey results indicate that Belgian SMEs bear considerably higher TCCs. Further-
more, it has been established that these compliance costs are strongly regressive in nature.
Since a high tax burden might restrain firm growth, it is imperative that governments take
measures to keep compliance costs as low as possible.
The Belgian government has already taken a number of initiatives in order to
tackle the significant tax compliance burden that exists for SMEs. The objectives
of these measures are twofold. First, the Belgian government intends to directly reduce
the TCCs for small businesses. Second, by allocating various tax benefits to small
companies, the government aims to alleviate the relatively high tax compliance burden
that exists for these firms. For instance, the corporate tax rate for Belgian companies
normally amounts to 33.99%. However, for small businesses having a taxable income
lower than 322500, there exists a reduced and progressive rate equaling 24.98% for
the taxable income bracket between 1 and 25 000; 31.93% for the bracket between
25 000 and 90 000; and, finally, 35.54% for the 90 000 ^ 322500 bracket. With
respect to income tax withholding, small companies are allowed to deposit the
amounts withheld from their employees quarterly, whereas larger companies have
to pay monthly. A final example is the introduction of the VAT registration limit.
Companies having a turnover that is less than 5580 are not liable to VAT registra-
tion. However, when compared with the VAT registration threshold in the UK, for
instance (currently »70 000), this limit is quite low. Poutziouris et al (1999) argue that
an increase in the VAT registration threshold might further reduce TCCs. In spite
of the efforts that have already been made by the Belgian government, our results,
nevertheless, clearly indicate that TCCs are still relatively high for small companies.
Since high TCCs might impede innovation and growth, it is necessary that policy
makers continuously strive to further reduce them. With this intention in mind, we
formulate some suggestions.
First, governments should be aware of the educational function that they have with
regard to the understanding and interpretation of the complex tax regulation. Compa-
nies often spend much time in analyzing the difficult and unstable tax legislation in
order to find out which tax rules exactly apply to them in a certain tax year. Firms
regularly even appeal to expensive tax experts to assist them in correctly interpreting
the tax laws. Prefiling compliance costs are therefore often extremely high for certain
taxes (eg, VAT). Consequently, simplifying tax legislation should be one of the major
objectives of policy makers in order to decrease compliance costs. In addition, it
is recommended that governments should develop information technology tools to
facilitate the understanding, interpretation, and calculation of taxes for taxpayers.
Guyton et al (2005) have already shown that the use of tax software might lower
TCCs.
Table 6. Sensitivity analyses.
Internal ( ) External ( ) Average absolute TCC relative TCC relative
TCC to assets to GVA
50 70 26 230.540 0.021 0.071
50 50 25 081.200 0.020 0.063
30 40 18 959.840 0.015 0.048
70 50 30 137.610 0.023 0.074
Note: GVA—gross added value; TCC—tax compliance cost.
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A second recommendation concerns the timing of changes in tax legislation.
In Belgium tax laws are very unstable, which is problematic in itself. In addition, the
changes often become effective during the income year. For instance, in Belgium,
luncheon vouchers were not tax deductible until 1 February 2009. Since then, luncheon
vouchers have been deductible at 1 per voucher. This implies that for income year
2009 (tax assessment year 2010) companies had to apply two different tax rules: one for
the month of January and one for the period February ^December. The application
of two (or more) different tax rules being effective consecutively in one income year
complicates the calculation of taxable income to a considerable extent, thereby
drastically increasing filing compliance costs. It therefore is recommended that govern-
ments relate the effective date of new tax legislation to a tax assessment year rather
than to a predetermined date in the income year.
Third, governments increasingly aim to apply `green taxation'. Notwithstanding
the importance of encouraging sustainable entrepreneurship, the shift towards green
taxation often causes high compliance costs. Additional `reforming' taxes are imple-
mented and existing taxes are modified, resulting in high prefiling compliance
costs. Furthermore, filing costs can also augment to a large extent. In Belgium, for
example, the tax deductibility of costs related to company cars has recently been
linked to the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2). Depending on the CO2 emission,
car costs are deductible for 50% to 120%. For firms having company cars with
different emission rates, this regulation obviously causes a very complex and difficult
calculation of the tax-deductible car costs. Compliance costs could be reduced by
immediately taxing (accounting for the CO2 emission of the car) at the moment of
purchase. It is thus advisable that governments, while striving for a more `green'
taxation, evaluate the impact of this new regulation on TCCs and seek to reduce
compliance costs as much as possible.
Fourth, since some expenses that are recognized as costs for the purpose of
financial reporting are not tax deductible, differences exist between accounting income
and taxable income. As a result, firms must calculate both their accounting and
taxable profit. Compliance costs could be significantly reduced by making all account-
ing costs tax deductible and thus by equating accounting income and taxable income.
In Belgium most companies are obliged to draw up their financial accounts on a yearly
basis. Consequently, firms would not have to make any additional compliance costs
when they would be taxed on their accounting income. It can be argued that this
approach could lead to an increase in the number of malpractices. On the other
hand, tax inspectors would have more time to focus on the authenticity and legitimacy
of the costs themselves instead of concentrating on the legitimacy of the tax rules that
are applied.
A final recommendation concerns the consultation of fiscal experts. Governments
often neglect to consult fiscal experts from the private sector when they plan to
introduce new laws. As a consequence, the impact of new legislation on TCCs is
frequently overlooked or underestimated. It would therefore be advisable that policy
makers seek advice from fiscal experts and take their recommendations into account in
order to keep compliance costs as low as possible.(6)
(6) An overview of `best practices' that have already been implemented in Europe can be found in
`` Models to reduce the disproportionate regulatory burden on SMEs'' by the EC (2007).
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7 Conclusion
We have presented evidence, collected from a sample of Flemish SMEs, concerning
TCCs. Belgium is already a country with one of the highest tax burdens in the world
(Poutziouris et al, 2003). In addition, our results indicate that TCCs are significant,
exceeding over 7% of added value. Furthermore, we confirm the regressivity hypoth-
esis, found in other empirical work. Obviously, like all surveys in this field, ours is not
without limitations. One weakness is that we do not attempt to separate accounting
from TCCs. There are taxpayers who regard all costs involved in the preparation of
accounting as compliance costs, because taxation is the only reason that they have
an accounting system. For other companies tax compliance is only one byproduct of
their accounting system (Tran-Nam et al, 2000). Given the already detailed and time-
consuming nature of our survey, we limited ourselves to tax compliance tasks and did
not inquire specifically about accounting functions. This may potentially have biased
our estimates of compliance costs upwards, especially for smaller companies. On the
other hand, nonlabor compliance costsöas in most studiesöhave been ignored. This
probably causes underestimation of the true compliance costs to some extent. Further-
more, we did not take into account the tax benefits that the deductable compliance
costs generate. To do so would require knowledge of the effective marginal tax rates per
company, which was not available to us. As a consequence, our measure of compliance
costs is gross or before tax. Finally, there are probably also benefits in terms of
improved management knowledge, better tax planning opportunities, etc, forthcoming
from compliance activities, which are also not taken into account.
The increasing tax complexity in many countries, together with the growth of the
importance of the small business sector, has raised the awareness concerning TCCs for
SMEs. In response to this public awareness, some governments, for instance in the UK
and Australia, accompany new tax legislation with some form of compliance cost
impact statement. Although it seems appropriate to simplify the taxation system in
order to decrease compliance costs, policy makers counterargue that taxes can be
useful in reforming the economy (Gunz et al, 1995; Kitching, 2006). Environmental
taxes, for example, can stimulate an evolution towards durable economic growth.
Governments clearly need to make a difficult trade-off between tax simplifications
resulting in lower compliance costs and introductions of new tax regulations in order
to stimulate desirable economic behavior.
Future research might investigate whether the beneficial effects of additional
reforming taxes outweigh the high costs of a complex tax system. Furthermore, it
might be interesting to empirically evaluate the effects of high compliance costs on
the performance, growth, profitability, innovation, etc of firms. Until now, research
has mainly focused on the magnitude and determinants of TCCs. The possible conse-
quences of a burdensome taxation system are, by contrast, highly underresearched.
Another issue for future research is our counterintuitive finding that compliance costs
are higher for nonexporting companies.
References
Ariff M, Ismail Z, Loh A, 1997, `` Compliance costs of corporate income taxation in Singapore''
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 24 1253 ^ 1268
Armstrong J, Overton T, 1977, `` Estimating nonresponse bias in mail surveys'' Journal of Marketing
Research 14 396 ^ 402
Blazic H, 2005, `` Tax compliance costs for companies in Slovenia and Croatia'' FinanzArchiv 61
418 ^ 437
Blumenthal M, Slemrod J B, 1992, `` The compliance cost of the US individual income tax system:
second look after tax reform'' National Tax Journal 45 185 ^ 202
Blumenthal M, Slemrod J B, 1996, ``The income tax compliance costs of big businesses'' Public
Finance Quarterly 24 411 ^ 438
618 B Schoonjans, P Van Cauwenberge, C Reekmans, G Simoens
Chan S, Cheung D, Ariff M, Loh A, 1999, `` Compliance costs of corporate taxation in Hong Kong''
International Tax Journal 25 42 ^ 69
Chittenden F, Poutziouris P, Michaelas N,Watts T, 1999, `` Taxation and small firms: creating
incentives for the reinvestment of profits''Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy
17 271 ^ 286
Chittenden F, Kauser S, Poutziouris P, 2003, `` Tax regulation and small business in the USA, UK,
Australia and New Zealand'' International Small Business Journal 21 93 ^ 115
Chittenden F, Kauser S, Poutziouris P, 2005, `` PAYE-NIC compliance costs: empirical evidence
from the UK SME economy'' International Small Business Journal 23 635 ^ 656
Cnossen S, 1994, ``Administrative and compliance costs of theVAT: a review of evidence'' Tax Notes
63 1609 ^ 1626
Cnossen S,Verwaal E, 2002, `` Europe's new border taxes'' Journal of Common Market Studies 40
309 ^ 330
Collard D, Godwin M, 1999, `` Compliance costs for employers: UK PAYE and national insurance
1995 ^ 96'' Fiscal Studies 20 423 ^ 449
Coolidge J, Ilic D, Kisunko G, 2009, `` Small businesses in South Africa: who outsources tax
compliance work and why?'',WP 4873, Policy ResearchWorking Paper,World Bank,
Washington, DC
EC, 2007, `` Models to reduce the disproportionate regulatory burden on SMEs'', European
Commission, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/files/support measures/
regmod/regmod en.pdf
Gunz S, MacNaughton A,Wensley K, 1995, `` Measuring the compliance costs of tax expenditures:
the case of research and development incentives'' Canadian Tax Journal 43 2008 ^ 2034
Gurd B, Smith M, Turner J L, 1998, ``Auditing income tax self-assessment: the hidden cost of
compliance'' Journal of Managerial Auditing 13 95 ^ 100
Guyton J L, Korobow AK, Lee P S,Toder E J, 2005, `` The effects of tax software and paid preparers
on compliance costs'' National Tax Journal 58 439 ^ 448
Hanefah M, Ariff M, Kasipillai J, 2002, `` Compliance costs of small and medium enterprises''
Chartered Accountants Journal 4 73 ^ 94
Hansford A, Hasseldine J, Howorth C, 2003, `` Factors affecting the costs of UK VAT compliance
for small and medium-sized enterprises''Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy
21 479 ^ 492
Holtzman Y, 2007, `` Challenges in achieving transparency, simplicity and administering of the
United States tax code'' Journal of Management Development 26 418 ^ 427
Kitching J, 2006, ``A burden on business? Reviewing the evidence base on regulation and small-
business performance'' Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 24 799 ^ 814
O'Reilly P, 2005, `` SMEs hard-hit by compliance costs'' Chartered Accountants Journal November,
page 15
Pope J, 1993, `` The compliance costs of taxation in Australia and tax simplification: the issues''
Australian Journal of Management 18 69 ^ 89
Pope J, Rametse N, 2001,``Small business and the goods and services tax''Small Enterprise Research
9 42 ^ 54
Poutziouris P, Chittenden F, Michaelas N, 1999, `` Modelling the impact of taxation on the small-
business economy: the NatWest/MBS tax index for the self-employed, sole-traders, and
partnerships'' Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 17 577 ^ 592
Poutziouris P, Chittenden F,Watts T, Soufani K, 2003, ``A comparative analysis of the impact of
taxation on the SME economy: the case of UK and US ^NewYork State in the year 2000''
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 21 493 ^ 508
PwC, Federation of Enterprises in Belgium, 2009, `` Total tax contribution'',
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Federation of Enterprises in Belgium, Brussels,
http://www.vbo-feb.be/index.html?page=165
PwC,World Bank Group, 2008, `` Paying taxes 2008'', PriceWaterhouseCoopers and theWorld
Bank Group, http://www.pwc.com/en GX/gx/paying-taxes/pdf/paying taxes 2008.pdf
PwC,World Bank Group, 2011, `` Paying taxes 2011'', PricewaterhouseCoopers, and theWorld
Bank Group, http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/paying-taxes/pdf/paying-taxes-2011.pdf
Sandford C, 1995 Tax Compliance Costs: Measurement and Policy (Fiscal Publications, Bath,
Somerset)
Sandford C, Godwin M, Hardwick P, 1989 Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation
(Fiscal Publications, Bath, Somerset)
A survey of tax compliance costs of Flemish SMEs 619
Slemrod J, 2004, ``Are corporate tax rates, or countries, converging?''Journal of Public Economics 88
1169 ^ 1186
Slemrod J,Venkatesh V, 2002, `` The income tax compliance cost of large and mid-size businesses'',
paper no. 914, Ross School of Business, Ann Arbor, MI
Smulders S, Stiglingh M, 2008, ``Annual tax compliance costs for small businesses: a survey of tax
practitioners in South Africa'' South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences
11 354 ^ 371
Soufani K, 2003, `` Small business growth and tax policy in Canadaöa theoretical model''
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 21 567 ^ 578
Tran-Nam B, Evans C,Walpole M, Ritchie K, 2000, `` Tax compliance costs: research methodology
and empirical evidence from Australia'' National Tax Journal 53 229 ^ 252
Vaillancourt F, 1986, `` The compliance costs of taxes on businesses and individuals: a review of
the evidence'' Public Finance 42 395 ^ 419
Vandenbussche H, Crabbe¨ K, Janssen B, 2005, `` Is there regional tax competition? Firm level
evidence for Belgium''De Economist 153 257 ^ 276
620 B Schoonjans, P Van Cauwenberge, C Reekmans, G Simoens
Appendix. Taxes in Belgium (source: PwC and Federation of Enterprises in Belgium, 2009).
Product taxes Product taxes (continued)
Irrecoverable value-added tax (VAT) Contribution to the Banking Commission
Net VAT Customs duties
Tax on stock exchange transactions Excise duties on mineral oil
Tax on carry-over transactions Energy contribution (only on electricity)
Tax on delivery or bearer securities Federal contribution on energy
Insurance premium tax Car registration tax
Tax on long-term savings Road tax
Withholding tax on benefits that result from
occupational benefit schemes
Additional road tax
Withholding tax on benefits that result from life
insurance and pension savings contracts
Compensatory excise tax
Health insurance contributions on the civil aspect
of car insurance
Road toll (Eurovignette)
Contributions on hospitalization insurance Municipal road tax
Contributions on fire insurance, car insurance,
and industrial accident insurance
Excise duties on tobacco products
Contribution on insurance contracts for the Belgian
Red Cross
Excise duties on alcoholic beverages
Contribution to the security fund for fire and
explosion
Excise duties on other beverages
Betting and gaming taxes paid to the tax authorities Packaging contribution
Gaming machine license duty paid to the tax
authorities
Annual tax on profit sharing
Horse racing betting shop tax Profit taxes
Tax on office areas Corporate tax
Tax on employed staff Yearly company contribution
Bill-posting taxes Withholding tax on income from investment
Advertising hoardings tax Country or residence tax withheld at source
Tax on motor power Pharma levy
Tax on computer screens Regional tax on companies
Bank and financial institutions tax Provincial tax on companies
ATM tax Elia tax
Tax on trading areas Property taxes
Car park tax Property tax
Vending machine tax Stamp duty
Tax on liquor store opening (Wallonia only) Registration duties
Patent tax Employment taxes
Tax on pylons Employer social security contribution
Net asset tax Withholding tax on professional income
Annual tax on coordination centers Employee social security contribution
Special tax on bearer bonds held by financial
intermediaries
Special social security contribution
Special tax on retained profits of certain credit
institutions
Tax on employee equity participation and employee
participation in profits and corporate results
Contributions on fire insurance, car insurance
and industrial accident insurance
Contributions on pensions
Annual estate tax for pension funds Pension solidarity contribution
Environmental taxes Environmental taxes (continued)
Carbon dioxide solidarity contribution on
company cars
Tax on hazardous, insalubrious and impracticable
establishments
Ecotaxes Urban development levy
Environment contribution Food safety tax
Tax on industrial packaging Major accident hazard levy for certain industrial
activities
Tax on waste Ionizing radiation levy
Sewerage tax Hazardous substances levy
Tax on printed advertising materials Fixed tank tax
Tax on the discharge of waste water Tax on distribution apparatus for liquid or gaseous
fuels
Levy on surface water catchments Tax on scrap metal and scrap vehicle dumps
Tax on underground water Gravel tax
Tax to combat and prevent empty and abandoned
business premises and the decay of buildings
ß 2011 Pion Ltd and its Licensors
Conditions of use. This article may be downloaded from the E&P website for personal research
by members of subscribing organisations. This PDF may not be placed on any website (or other
online distribution system) without permission of the publisher.
